SINGAPORE, 22 Jan 2026 – In 2025, China recorded just 7.92 million births, the lowest in recent history. Even more alarming, renowned Chinese demographer Liang Zhongtang warned that years of tweaked census numbers mean the country’s true population may be far below the current official 1.4 billion.
He suggested China’s total fertility rate could have dropped below 0.7—potentially even lower than South Korea’s—signaling a demographic collapse that could reshape the nation’s future. Fertility rate refers to the average number of children a woman is expected to have over her lifetime,
China’s National Bureau of Statistics announced on Monday that the population at the end of 2025 stood at 1.40489 billion, down 3.39 million from the end of 2024. The year saw just 7.92 million births—implying a crude birth rate of 5.63 per thousand—while deaths reached 11.31 million, or 8.04 per thousand. This produced a natural population growth rate of minus 2.41 per thousand, marking the fourth consecutive year of decline.
Population matters remain highly sensitive in China. Many online media have highlighted the shocking drop below 8 million, but experts say the actual figures could be even more concerning.
Liang, 77, stated that China has conducted national population censuses since 1982, followed by full counts every ten years in 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2020. Between these censuses, smaller surveys were conducted to track trends—sampling about 1% of the population every five years and 0.1% annually. These surveys were intended to monitor population change without conducting a full census each year.
“When the government conducted these surveys, they based them on an expected annual population growth of at least 10 million,” Liang said. “Survey methods and results were adjusted to meet that expectation.” These adjustments were never disclosed to the public, though many population researchers are aware of them.
Liang was a rare voice within China’s governance circles who had openly opposed the one-child policy and later other family planning measures. He served as deputy director of the Shanxi Academy of Social Sciences and worked at the National Family Planning Commission from 1988 to 2008. Last year, he published Looking Back on Xizhou Road—A Critique of Demographic Hegemonism in China in the United States, documenting his research on China’s demography, population statistics, and academic culture.
Following Monday’s announcement, Liang acknowledged that China did at one point experience net population growth exceeding 10 million annually. But after the 1990s, as the large 1962 to 1972 birth cohort had married and completed childbearing, the overall fertility rate fell. He also highlighted rural-to-urban migration: tens of millions—and possibly up to 200–300 million—farmers relocated to cities, reshaping social structures and sharply reducing fertility.
By 2000, population growth had slowed even more. Statistical authorities, finding this trend at odds with previous data, attributed the sharp drop in fertility to “omission or underreporting” and repeatedly revised the results with each new survey, operating under the assumption that the population must grow by at least 10 million people per year. Liang emphasized that these adjustments were unjustified and led to a significant overestimation of China’s population.
“Hence, the country’s actual total population is well below 1.4 billion, and women’s fertility rate is far lower than official statistics suggest,” he stressed.
Official census data show China’s total fertility rate (TFR) as 2.64 in 1982, 2.14 in 1990, 1.30 in 2000, 1.18 in 2010, and 1.30 in 2020. Liang pointed out the inconsistencies in these numbers. For example, it seems implausible that fertility remained at 1.30 in both 2000 and 2020 despite profound social change, or that it rose from 1.18 in 2010 to 1.30 in 2020, even as annual births declined by nearly one million on average.
Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao cited Lu Jiehua, vice president of the Chinese Population Association and professor at Renmin University, as saying that China’s fertility rate fell below 1 last year, “similar to Singapore,” which recorded 0.97 in 2024. Liang, however, believes China’s actual rate is even lower than South Korea’s.
By 2000, Japan’s TFR was 1.36 and South Korea’s 1.47, while China’s stood at 1.30. By 2024, Japan’s rate had fallen to 1.15 and South Korea’s sharply to 0.75. With China’s newborn population dropping from 17.71 million in 2000 to 9.54 million in 2024, Liang argues that China’s TFR today is likely below 0.7, lower than South Korea’s.
Observers warn that China’s demographic trend as affirmed on Monday could have severe socioeconomic consequences. If it continues, in about 30 years there will be far fewer young people to support an aged population. Early signs are already visible in declining preschool enrollments, a trend likely to extend to schools and universities, while the growing elderly population will strain healthcare resources.
According to China’s official statistics, from late 1970s to 1980s, the country’s annual births were between 17–25 million. The 1990s saw births gradually declined but stayed about 18–21 million per year. In the 2000s, fertility continued to fall, with annual births stabilizing around 15–16 million. A brief uptick occurred in 2012 before the decline resumed. From late 2010s–2020s, births dropped sharply, reaching about 12 million in 2020 and about 10.6 million in 2021.
In recent years, annual births ranged from 9–10 million in 2022–2024, then plunged to approximately 7.9 million in 2025, marking the lowest yearly total on record.
