(SINGAPORE 2026.4.30) On April 28, an article published on the Chinese Ministry of State Security’s official WeChat account warning against the “lying flat” (躺平） mentality and blaming its persistence on foreign interference spread rapidly online in China. The piece struck an unusually blunt tone.
The article argued that certain online narratives—especially those advocating a “lying flat” lifestyle —were not simply expressions of social frustrations but were being encouraged and amplified by foreign elements. It said that these external forces had used local influencers to deliberately exaggerate social anxieties and structural barriers in China, distort perceptions of the country’s development challenges, and promote defeatist ideas such as “effort is futile” and “hard work leads nowhere”, thereby normalising withdrawal as a rational choice.
The implication of the article was unmistakable: pessimism is not merely a sentiment but a potential disaster to the country. Yet the forcefulness of the warning also underscored a growing disconnect between official view and lived experience—particularly among younger Chinese facing a more constrained economic environment, critics noted.
The phrase “lying flat” rose to prominence in China around 2021, encapsulating a quiet rejection of relentless competition and a hectic pace of life—marked by stepping back from overwork, lowering expectations, and embracing a minimalist, low-consumption lifestyle.
Since then, Chinese authorities and state media have repeatedly pushed back against the concept. Online campaigns have targeted related content, and periodic internet crackdowns have seen some influencers linked to “lying flat” rhetoric restricted or banned.
Still, the term has not disappeared—only softened at the edges. According to Huxiu (虎嗅), a Chinese tech and business outlet, its persistence points to deeper socioeconomic shifts in China that cannot be resolved through moralising messaging alone.
Recent labor market data highlights the strain, it noted. Youth unemployment among those aged 16 to 24 has climbed to 16.9%, while the rate for those aged 25 to 29 stands at 7.7%—the highest since the current data series began in 2023.
At the same time, the structure of opportunity is changing.
For much of the past two decades, rapid growth in sectors like real estate and internet platforms generated large numbers of jobs and supported broad income gains. These industries were labor-intensive and created spillover benefits, allowing a wide range of workers to share the economic growth.
That dynamic has now weakened. The property sector is mired in a prolonged downturn, while major internet platforms have moved past their most explosive growth phase. Newer industries such as artificial intelligence are driving investment and productivity, but they tend to be more capital- and skill-intensive—benefiting a narrow slice of the workforce.
In some cases, technological adoption has also reduced hiring needs, reinforcing a more polarized labor market. At one end are high-pressure roles in large firms, often defined by long hours and demanding performance targets. At the other are lower-paid service jobs or intermittent employment. Between them, the path to stable upward mobility appears less certain than it once was.
Meanwhile, longstanding workplace concerns persist. Public debate continues to focus on excessive overtime, uneven enforcement of labor protections, and hiring practices that disadvantage middle-aged workers.
For some observers, these factors help explain why “lying flat” continues to resonate. As one widely shared commentary put it, the issue is not whether young people are willing to work hard, but whether the returns on that effort still feel credible.
This presents a policy dilemma, critics lamented. Officials stress the importance of maintaining confidence in future, social cohesion, and a strong work ethic—especially in an economy facing external uncertainty. But economists and commenters increasingly point to the need for stronger incentives: more stable employment, better enforcement of labor rights, and clearer avenues for advancement.
Proposals raised in public discussions include tighter limits on working hours, broader social insurance coverage, and measures to curb discrimination in hiring based on age, marital status, or experience.
While Chinese officials often frame pessimistic discourse as something to be managed, many analysts argue that public sentiment is ultimately shaped by on-the-ground conditions. External influences may shape how ideas spread, but they are less likely to gain traction without the help of existing pressures, they contend.
As one commenter wrote in response to the April 28 article: “Without fuel, even a spark will not catch.”
Five years on, “lying flat” persists not because it is being promoted, but because it continues to reflect a reality many recognize, Huxiu observed. For policymakers, the challenge is no longer just how to counter and suppress the phrase—but how to address the conditions that made it resonate in the first place.
Although the April 28 article claimed that a sizable group of online influencers promote the “lying flat” mentality, it did not specify any names or account IDs, nor did it cite concrete cases.
Some netizens suggested that a group of “lying flat” influencers who have become popular in recent years on the short-video platforms of Douyin (抖音） and Kuaishou （快手） may have been the intended target of the article. It appears to imply that they may have received foreign support.
The article also did not announce any punishments or enforcement actions such as arrests or formal penalties. Instead, it called for a counter-narrative and ideological warning campaign to push back against what it sees as prevailing pessimism in China.
